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 * Professor of International Relation at the University of Tampere (hiski.haukkala@uta.fi) 
On 27th and 28th of September 2012 the fourth German-Nordic-Baltic Forum took place. The conference was entitled “EU 
Responses to external challenges as seen from Germany, Poland, Nordic and Baltic countries and the EU neighbourhood”. Not 
only experts from the Baltic States, the Nordic States, Poland and Germany participated in the forum, but for the first time also 
scientists coming from those countries to which the EU policies are addressed. Thus, a fruitful exchange of ideas and opinions 
among the stakeholders involved on the contents of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and its perception among the 
partner states could be achieved.  
 
The expert seminar was organised by the Institut für Europäische Politik (IE) in cooperation with the Finnish Institute of 
International Affairs (FIIA), Helsinki and took place at the premises of FIIA. The conference was generously supported by the 
Federal Foreign Office and the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
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Hiski Haukkala* 
THE KEY SECURITY CHALLENGE IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION  
IS THE LACK OF TRUST 
 
The end of the Cold War heralded an unprecedented wave of cooperative security -based regional 
cooperation schemes in Northern Europe. The promise of the 1990s in post-Wall Europe but 
perhaps in particular in the North was an era free of divisions based on increased cooperation and 
even integration over the former East–West division. 
 
To a great extent this has also taken place. For example, the subsequent rounds of EU and NATO 
enlargements have expanded the euro-Atlantic security community further to the East than was 
originally ever anticipated. This has brought manifold gains both in economic, political and 
security political respects. In several respects the heart of these processes in Northern Europe has 
been the Baltic Sea Region (BSR). In the words of Pertti Joenniemi (2009) the BSR acted as a 
laboratory for innovative forms of regional cooperation and governance. 
 
That said, the process has also had some unintended consequences. The biggest of them has 
perhaps been that Russia has increasingly felt sidelined and alienated from many of these 
processes. Although the hand of partnership has been repeatedly extended on both sides of the 
former East–West divide, both parties have in fact walked away from these encounters 
disappointed and with growing mutual disillusionment. 
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There is hardly any reason to lay the blame on this occasion. It seems obvious that both sides of 
the fence can make a convincing case that will support their arguments. Yet the fact of the matter 
is that the dividing lines in the North have not been erased. On the contrary, they seem to be 
resurfacing and deepening again. This is worrisome as they have the potential to undermine, and 
with time also undo, the emergence of a budding security community also in the North. 
 
In the work of Karl Deutsch (1968) the main defining characteristic of a security community is 
the jointly shared belief in the possibility, indeed necessity of peaceful change within that 
community. Resort to violence is deemed as unacceptable and there is a mutual willingness to 
look for political means to resolve possible conflicts. For Deutsch, doing his work in the midst of 
the Cold War, clear examples of a security community were Scandinavia and the relations 
between the United States and Canada. 
 
It can be argued that during the 1990s there were some signs of a security community that would 
have included also Russia being built in the North. For example, the metamorphosis of security 
related debates in the North is a case in point. The old Cold War agenda of hard military security 
was quickly replaced with a host of soft security issues. In stark contrast to the previous era, 
security was no longer seen as a divisive issue. On the contrary, instead of zero-sum mentality 
ultimately based on the insane notion of mutually assured destruction the new period witnessed 
the emergence of cooperative approaches to security. Security was seen as indivisible and 
common to all the actors. As a consequence, hard security issues were largely removed from the 
agenda, clearing space for the emergence of regionally based cooperation, even integration. 
 
A return of fear to the Baltic Sea? 
 
Against this backdrop one of the most intriguing and worrying developments have been the re-
emergence of hard security related issues and even fears in the Baltic Sea. Often the Nord Stream 
gas pipeline is pointed out as an issue that has resulted in fresh divisions and concerns in the 
region. For example the Baltic states as well as Sweden voiced concerns over the detrimental 
hard security affects the project will have on their security. Some of the scenarios entertained, for 
example, in Stockholm concerning the increased likelihood of the use of Russian force in the 
BSR speak volumes about the lack of a fully shared expectation of peaceful change in the region. 
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The same can be said about some of the Russian military exercises in the region in recent years. 
Yet it could be that the crux of the issue is not the existence of the pipeline per se. Instead, a more 
accurate reading of the pipeline’s significance is that it is a symptom and not the root cause of the 
lack of trust that seems to be the real underlying issue in the BSR. 
 
On the Western (and Northern and Southern) shores of the Baltic Sea the main source for concern 
seems to be Russia. On the one hand Russia’s domestic development is seen as worrisome. It is 
hard to find a country in the BSR that has not voiced concerns over Russia’s development. Even 
the traditionally cautious Finland has made noises to that effect. On the other hand Russia’s 
voiced ambitions to increase military spending and consequently also presence in the BSR is a 
concern. These worries have been accentuated by the August 2008 conflict with Georgia that 
showed that Russia does not shy away from using military force against its neighbours if it deems 
it necessary. 
 
These concerns are compounded by the perceived decline in the internal cohesion and solidarity 
in the European Union and NATO. To a degree, the case can be made that, and although 
somewhat paradoxically their increased presence has acted as a backdrop to the increased discord 
between the ‘West’ and Russia, they have also been instrumental in creating the prerequisites for 
the emergence of the positive dynamics in the BSR during the post-Cold War era (Haukkala 
2009). The EU has brought the positive forces of integration and regional integration to the fore 
while NATO and the US security guarantees have brought the reassurance to some of the 
countries in the region to engage also Russia in these processes. Yet in recent years both the role 
of the EU and NATO has being questioned in the region and this is a factor that is breeding 
insecurity in its own right in the BSR. For example, although the emergence of increased Nordic 
cooperation in the field of defence (NORDEFCO, see http://www.nordefco.org/) can be seen as a 
reaction to the ongoing financial austerity in Europe, it is not far-fetched to argue that it also has a 
more nervous edge to it as a response to the perceived or potential decline in euro-Atlantic 
solidarity when it comes to the North. For the same reason the Baltic states seem to be eager to 
increase ties and cooperation with the Nordics, although every in question is of course fully 
aware that the Nordics are ill-equipped to take the lead in guaranteeing regional security. 
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On the Russia side the lack of trust is clearly visible as well. The host of military exercises were 
already noted but obviously too much should not be read into them as militaries often plan and 
train for every contingencies. Interestingly Russia’s drive to secure direct ways for shipping its 
natural gas and oil to world markets free of intermediaries is a telling sign: Russia does not seem 
to accept nor appreciate interdependence and the positive win–win dynamics that regional 
cooperation and division of labour could bring but seems to prefer direct control over key 
infrastructure. This drive for control is a factor that breeds suspicion in the region while 
increasing Russia’s leverage over some of its neighbours. Russia has also become an increasingly 
vocal opponent to NATO – and at times it seems to even NORDEFCO as well – in the region and 
is overall very keen to accentuate the harder spectrum of security over the soft one – another 
political and rhetorical move that betrays the lack of trust on the Russian side while increasing 
the feeling of potential vulnerability on the other side. In the BSR context, if one removes the 
NATO and to a lesser extent the EU overlay, the disparities between Russia and the other 
countries are vast. The end result is the current vicious circle of diminishing trust and increase of 
mutual suspicion that, if left unchecked, seems set to bring the old security problematic and 
dilemma on the agenda also in the Baltic Sea. 
 
The way forward 
 
In light of this brief analysis, what could be done? As was already noted, the aim of this exercise 
is not to lay the blame for the current state of affairs. Many in the region would probably agree 
that Russia’s domestic trajectory will be one of the key ingredients in the future. Yet as it seems 
far-fetched to expect Russia to radically change its course so we must start looking for ways to 
find a working modus vivendi in the Baltic Sea based on the current realities. As crazy and 
anachronistic as it may sound, perhaps the countries in the region should re-visit some of the 
older debates concerning European security from the Cold War. The CSCE was the key in 
developing mechanisms for confidence-building measures (see Holst 1983) – and increased 
confidence in the objectives of others seems to be the key for restoring trust also on the regional 
level. The issue of tactical nuclear warheads could be one topic for discussions in the future.  
 
Another ingredient required might be that Germany takes a stronger role in the Baltic Sea 
Region. As was already mentioned, the disparities between Russia and the rest of the countries in 
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the BSR are vast. Although these asymmetries have been balanced by the EU and NATO 
overlays in the region they have not supplanted the need for regional leadership as well. Until 
recently it has seemed as if Germany has shied away from this role and preferred to delegate the 
BSR policy to some of its Northern Länder. Yet the recent active and very purposeful German 
Presidency of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (2011–12) gives grounds to hope that it might 
be willing to assume a more active position in future. This would also be required as of all the 
countries in the region only Berlin can be seen as being politically on par with Russia to engage 
Moscow in a debate while taking the lead in the intra-EU and -NATO processes to come up with 
a common blueprint concerning the region. 
 
To conclude, perhaps the best way to move forward in the future is to stop the pretence that the 
positive agenda of the 1990s is fully alive and well in the whole of the BSR and take the bull by 
the horns. A good deal of the original promise has been achieved but it all could be in danger of 
unravelling if Russia does not find a role with which everyone is comfortable in the region. 
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